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Immigration does not undermine public support for social
policy
In the U.S and other rich democracies, many commentators have linked the rise of anti-foreigner
sentiments in recent decades with rising levels of immigration. But do higher levels of immigration
also undermine public support for social policies? Using survey data from 17 rich democracies,
David Brady and Ryan Finnigan find little evidence to support this claim. They write that
immigration may even surprisingly encourage public support for the welfare state.
In the last few decades, Europe and other affluent democracies have conducted something like a
natural experiment. While rising immigration to the United States is well known, most of Europe’s
rich countries have also experienced a surge of immigration in a relatively short period of time.
The starkest cases were Spain and Ireland, but almost all the affluent democracies experienced
this migration surge. In Spain, the percentage of foreign born quadrupled from 2.6 to 10.6 percent
of the population from 1996 to 2006. At the same time, Ireland went from having more out- than
in-migration in 1996 to a country that had more than 5 percent in-migration by 2006. This
remarkable increase in immigration was layered on top of the already notable cross-national
differences in immigration. In Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Switzerland, about 20 percent
of the population was foreign born in 2006, while Finland and Japan continued to have only a small share foreign
born.
Social scientists have exploited this striking social change to better understand how immigration and ethnic
heterogeneity affect attitudes, politics and behavior. For example, there is evidence that the rising immigration to
Europe in the 1990s triggered a rise in anti-foreigner sentiments, and extreme Right parties have reemerged in a
number of countries. In our recent research, we have investigated if rising immigration has undermined public
support for social policy. More specifically, we looked at whether a country’s level of immigration has a negative
relationship with an individual’s belief in, and preferences for, social policy.
Whether immigration undermines public support for social policy is especially important given many scholars and
commentators have argued that ethnic heterogeneity undermines public goods. The argument has been that
when a country is more ethnically divided, people become reluctant to support social policies that might enhance
social equality and the well-being of vulnerable groups. Purportedly, ethnic fractionalization reduces one’s sense
of solidarity with other residents. This argument partly emerges from a long tradition of scholarship claiming that
ethnic homogeneity facilitated the development of the welfare state. The argument goes that the U.S. has a much
weaker welfare state than say Sweden because Sweden was ethnically homogenous and the U.S. was ethnically
divided. Further, as Sweden encounters rising immigration and the ensuing heterogeneity, it will converge on an
American welfare state because Swedes will no longer support social policy when the beneficiaries are Turks or
Somalis. Scholars have also provided experimental and observational evidence to show that ethnic heterogeneity
makes people less willing to invest in public goods.
To conduct our analysis, we utilize the 1996 and 2006 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which
featured a wide variety of questions on whether respondents support social policy. For example, two of the six
relevant questions ask: “Does the government have responsibility to reduce income differences between rich and
poor” and “Does the government have responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one?” With
multilevel models, we analyze data on 17 rich democracies merged with data on a country’s immigration flows
and stock. Flows measure changes in incoming and outgoing immigration, while stock measures the immigrant
share of the population at one point in time.
Our strategy was to estimate a large number of models to carefully assess if the relationship between immigration
and support for social policy was robust. We examined three different measures of immigration across the six
survey questions, and considered a wide variety of control variables at the individual (e.g. a respondent’s income)
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and country-level (e.g. the employment rate in the country). We analyzed differences between countries as well
as change over-time within
countries. In short, we tried to
provide the most comprehensive
test to date.
Much to our surprise, and
contrary to the vast group of
scholars and commentators, we
found very little evidence that
immigration actually undermines
public support for social policy, as
Figure 1 illustrates. The stock of
immigration also had no effect in
about two-thirds of the models.
The one exception was that the
stock of immigration appears to
undermine support for the belief
that “government has a
responsibility to provide a job for
everyone who wants one.”
However, this piece of evidence
is modest compared to the much
more robust evidence that flows
of immigration actually tend to
increase support for social policy.
Indeed, we find that both net
migration and the over-time
change in the percent foreign born increase the odds that respondents believe governments have a responsibility
to provide housing, healthcare, pensions, unemployment assistance, and to reduce differences between rich and
poor.
Figure 1 – Association between support for providing decent living standard for the old and net migration
and % foreign born in 17 affluent democracies
How does one make sense of our mostly null results, the unexpected positive effects, and the sole negative
effects on the jobs question? We stress first and foremost that the null results are the prevailing pattern. Our
analyses mostly fail to show any effect. Hence, the correct and most appropriate interpretation is that other factors
are far more important to public support for social policy. This does not mean that people are supportive of
immigrants or immigration. Rather, it means that people often divorce any hostility to immigrants from their beliefs
about social policy. Ultimately, we encourage scholars and commentators to back off the bold claims about
immigration and social policy. Greater caution and fewer “universal” theories would improve how scholars and
commentators discuss the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the welfare state.
Despite our plea for greater caution and more skepticism with past arguments, we acknowledge it is at least
worthwhile to speculate on the other results. We interpret the positive effects of immigration flows as consistent
with the “compensation hypothesis.” In an environment of rapidly increasing immigration, respondents may feel
insecure and even threatened by the uncertainty and competition that immigration represents in their minds. This
context of unstable social change prompts respondents to seek relief and protection from the state. The acute
increase in immigration may lead people to demand the state to protect them rather than prefer the government
recede from helping people. For the unique results of immigrant stock and the jobs question, we interpret the
evidence as consistent with the “chauvinism hypothesis.” It could be that respondents view jobs as a zero-sum
competition for a finite resource. Perhaps also respondents think if the government provides a job for “everyone
who wants one” they are especially thinking of immigrants and are less willing to support social policies that might
help immigrants attain the same standard of living as natives.
Despite these possible interpretations, our major conclusion is that immigration does not undermine public support
for social policy. Even though many have argued that there is a “progressive’s dilemma” or
“heterogeneity/egalitarianism tradeoff,” our study mostly contradicts these views. It appears to be entirely possible
for countries to be ethnically heterogeneous and economically egalitarian. The rise of immigration does not truly
contradict or challenge a public’s willingness to protect the poor, the sick, unemployed or old. In the end, a far
more promising question is how, why, where and when does rising ethnic heterogeneity complement or coexist
with economic egalitarianism.
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